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IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T OF T H E S T A T E OF

ROSEMARY

WISCOMBE,

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs -

Appellant
law, stated

nonfactual>

BRIEF

or

and

:

is obliged

to point out m a t t e r s both

in r e s p o n d e n t ' s S a t e m e n t

"misrepresents

court."

He then

stated

p a r t i e s owned

fact

for

any record

indicates what

the

before

time
the

"true f a c t s " are.

is that at the time of the d i v o r c e

real p r o p e r t y having

a v a l u e of

( R e s p o n d e n t ' s Brief P. 3-4-) T h o s e
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he

no support

the first

on e s t i m a t e s and a p p r a i s a l s provided

85-91)."

misleading?

of F a c t s

the fact with

i n t r o d u c e s material

which w a s not a part of

appeal

are

fact

both.

alleges appellant
the record

Case No. 20333

in r e s p o n d e n t s b r i e f which

Beginning

based

REPLY

:

Defendant/Appellant.

first

:
:

J. W I L L I A M W I S C O M B E ,

and

UTAH

on
trial
His
"the

$780,200.00

by Willia-m

(R.

"estimates

and

in

appraisals" were pencilled notes of

the defendant attached to

his affidavit of income expenses and
appraisals as such are

needs? etc.

in the record.

No

In arriving at the

$7S0?000 respondent totally ignores the statements of debts
relating to those properties also a part of those same
estimates or exhibits.
(R. 88)

The indebtedness totals $54»2?800.

Moreover those same exhibits demonstrate that the

home was acquired

in 1977? the Evanston property acquired in

1973 and the Midvale property acquired

in 1978 and that based

on the acquisition costs as opposed to supposed market value
appraisal estimates after attributing

the respective

indebtedness chargeable against each unit that there was a
positive equity of $17?138 in the Evanston parcel? a negative
balance in the Midvale property of $4?2^E and a value in the
home of $10?450.

The net value therefore as to the two

rental units is $12?890 as opposed to the $10?450 in the home
awarded to plaintiff

(R. 89? 90 and 9 1 ) .

Plaintiff/

Respondent attempts to suggest with the isolated figure of
$780?000 that the property settlement was outlandishly
disproportionate.

In fact that division was stipulated

to by

the parties openly as to who was to receive what property and
who was to pay what debts.
Respondent next cites the divorce decree

claiming

that the residence given to the p1aintiff/respondent had a
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value of approximately "110,000" and cites the record
100 and 101.

at page

There is no stated value in that reference in

those paragraphs of the decree but only an itemization of the
mortgages against the property together with the language
directing the defendant/appelant to pay the first mortgage
and the p1aintiff/respondent to pay the second mortgage.
Going back, however, to the estimates earlier alluded to
(furnished by the defendant) the real equity in that property
was either the $10,^-50 noted above or

$125,000 based on the

defendant's estimate as to the fair market value.

Perhaps

respondent was rather relying on his client's resale of the
residence for $110,000 as asserted

in her Answers to

Interrogatories (Addendum to Appellant's Brief, p.
^t) (Respondent's ambivalence about those Answers to
Interrogatories will be treated more fully hereinafter).
decree further provided

in paragraph 8 (R.

The

117 and 118) that

the defendant pay the plaintiff the additional sum of $5,000
"as additional distribution of the parties' real property"
within six months from the date of decree which in fact the
defendant did pay and is acknowledged by receipt and partial
satisfaction dated 27 April 1982 (R. 130).
Repsondent then continues William

(plaintiff/

appellant) was ordered to pay the first mortgage on the
residence having a balance of approximately $52,800 and

-<f-

continues

M

the decree specifically stated that this was a

0EQ9§ElY §§iiI^H}§Di

anc

* that Rosemary

(plaintiff/

respondent) would be entitled to only $1 per year as
alimony" citing the record at page 118,

That citation makes

no such specific allegation that this was a "property
settlement" but rather as the decree itself provides it was
an assignment of debt just as the second mortgage debt on the
residence was assigned to the plaintiff and other debts of
the marriage as well as the outstanding

indebtedness on the

rental properties awarded to the defendant were respectively
disposed of.

Counsel for respondent thereafter

continually

refers to this payment of mortgage as a "property
settlement,"

There is no language in the decree so

characterizing it.
Respondent then cites her Answers to
Interrogatories as authority to assert that plaintiff/
respondent sold the family residence for a "small
downpayment" and specifically states "the buyers did not
assume the mortgage on the property and Rosemary
(plaint iff/respondent) is still liable for those payments."
Those answers are

found in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief,

pages 3-6? as follows:
"Question ^ ( e ) : Was the said home conveyed to buyer by
Uniform Real Estate Contract 5 deed and mortgage or trust
deed?
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"Answer:

Uniform Real Estate Contract.

"Question M f ) : Was there any escrow account established for
the payment of the underlying mortgages 7
"Answer:

Yes.

"Question 4 ( g ) : What arrangements were made with regard to
those mortgages and payment therefore 7
"Answer:
Escrow agent makes payment to Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan. CAt this point it should be observed that
the first mortgage and second mortgage on the family
residence were m favor of Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
as spelled out in the divorce decree. Paragraph 3 (R. 116)1
"Question 4 ( i ) : What notice of sale did you give to the
lending institutions holding the mortgages 7
"Answer:

None.

"Question 4 ( j ) : Who has made the payments on both mortgages
from that date to the present.
"Answer:
Alder-Wallace, Inc., as escrow agent for Rosemary
T. Siggard."
From the foregoing

it is apparent that the payments

from the buyer of the property go directly to pay the
mortgage payments through the escrow agent and that no notice
of sale was furnished by plaintiff/respondent
institution when she resold the home.
true that plamtiff/respondent

to the lending

While it is probably

is still signed on the

original first and second mortgages on that property for that
matter so also is the defendant/appellant.

The truth of

the matter is that p1aintiff/respondent's buyer has from the
time of the purchase of the property, September 5, 1981, been
the party actually making the payments and he does so because
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he is obligated to do so.

Defendant/appellant attached to

his addendum a copy of the actual real estate contract
between plaintiff/respondent and Mr. Jose N. Roco to further
corroborate those Answers to Interrogatories and as noted in
our intitial brief there is substantial

language in that

contract assuming the mortgages and holding

the

plaintiff/respondent harmless from those obligations.
Plaint iff/respondent wishes to have those documents stricken
because they never

"became a part of the record" below and

that is essentially appellant's point.
evidentiary hearing.

We never have had an

Judge Frederick has never permitted us

to produce that evidence to impeach the mere profers
presented by counsel for plaintiff/respondent
Commissioner Peuler.

before

What plaintiff/respondent succeeded in

keeping out below he wishes to keep this Court from noticing
on appeal.
It is perhaps appropriate at this point to
consider respondent's motion to strike (point 3 of
respondent's brief) the affidavit of Sandra N.

Peuler which

he also claims was unsigned and outside the record.
matter his memory is apparently short.

On that

The original of that

affidavit is indeed a part of the record but not the record
in the District Court but rather the record of pleadings in
this Court attached to appellant's Motion for Summary
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Disposition heretofore filed in this appeal.
an exhibit or

attachment to said Motion.

It is found as

Respondent's

counsel further argues that the Peuler affidavit is unsigned
and unacknowledged which with regard to the copy in
appellant's Addendum is true.

We accordingly attach as an

Addendum to this Reply Brief a xerox copy of the original
that is a part of the record before this Court showing it to
be both signed and indeed acknowledged.
Returning to respondent's statement of "true" facts
he next asserts that his client took the downpayment received
on the sale of the home in Holladay to purchase a condominium
in St. George and cites her Answers to Interrogatories.

A

reference again to those Answers shows that she received
$30,000 down from the sale of the home* the purchase price
for the condominium was $79,000, and that plaintiff/
respondent paid fi^OOO down on the purchase of that St.
George condominium.

So contrary to her counsel's assertion

that she used "the downpayment" to buy the St.
condominium she actually used one-thirtleth

George

(1/30) of the

downpayment on such purchase (addendum to appellant's brief
pages 4-, 5 and 6 ) .
Respondent next asserts that his client was
"forced" to lose her condominium
non-payment by appellant.

in St.

George because of

Both parties agree that when
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plaintiff/respondent sold the Holladay home and moved to St.
George defendant/ appellant continued to pay her the sum of
$600 a month as extra money by way of additional support
not the $578 per month required by the decree

(and

to be applied

on the first mortgage) through June of 1983 and that he then
reduced the extra supplemental payment to $300 a month
through November, 1983 (R. 116 and 2 3 7 ) .

In her Answers to

Interrogatories plaintiff/respondent admits that she
remarried hay 18, 1983 and moved to her new husband's home
which was purchased at the time of the marriage (Addendum to
appellant's brief? page 7 ) .

She was then asked what efforts

were made to refinance the contract on the sale of
in Salt Lake to get her full equity out.

the home

She answered none.

She was asked if any efforts were made to refinance the
equity in the condominium, and again answered no.

She was

asked what was the status of the foreclosure on her St.
George condominium and replied "none.

Quit-claim deed was

given to original seller, Nixon and Nixon, Inc."
to appellant's brief, 7 and 8 ) .

(Addendum

In short, contrary to her

counsel's assertion of being forced

to sell she did in fact

remarry, repurchase a new home, deed back to her condominium
seller the condominium and made no efforts to do any
refinancing of either the condominium or her contract on the
Salt Lake home.

In short, the claim that non-payment by
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defendant/appellant caused the loss of the condominium simply
is not true.
Respondent then says "William's attorney did not
say at any time in the hearing before Commissioner Peuler
that he does not accept the Commissioner's recommendations or
that he desired a further hearing before the District Court."
He then quotes that part of the record

before Commissioner

Peuler in which she announces who the judge would be to
consider any further hearing? to wit Judge Frederick, and
makes reference to the Commissioner's own minute entry
which says "Deft did not accept recommendation."
R. 137)

(R. 2^+1 and

By quoting those very items respondent is

acknowledging that the Commissioner at least was aware and
received communication from defense counsel that the
recommendation was not accepted and the Commissioner
indicated to counsel who the judge would be before whom
further proceedings would be had.
be needless or

Such an announcement would

superfluous if counsel had been silent or had

assented to her recommendations.

In sum therefore, even

though the transcript of the hearing before Commissioner
Peuler is incomplete on its face
original brief such of the record

as earlier noted in our
as is available

corroborates appellant's rather than respondent's position on
this point.

Moreover, the affidavit of Commissioner Peuler
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would appear conclusive on the matter as follows:
Such notice or communication of disagreement
or nonconcurrence has never been required by
Commissioner Peuler to be submitted in writing.
Frequently the nonconcurrence was announced in
open court at the time the recommended order was
announced? i_n whj^ch case such D2D^20£yLL§0^§ y^yld

k§ Qsii?^ i n the !uiQyt§

?Q£LY. ZQL

tti§i d^le^

§y^!2 §

^i§§9L?§!!!§0i. °L D°Qt9.n^y!IIl?DE§ 9.U ^!2§ £§L^ 5f the
^§f§D^§0^ ID £he case of Wiscqmbe v^_ Wiscombe was

o^d? \IY. ^ 2 ^ 0 5 ? ! I n ° E § D 9.9yL^ §od 52. D2t?d o.u
Q2!50]!i5ii5D?ii E § y l ? £ l § d}inyt§ §Dtcy I D t h a t (D^ti§ii
d§JL§d ^ y 9 y § i ?JL i ? ? f t i § £°EY_ 2 f ^ t i i ^ t i i § §QD§*§d
b§E§£o §^ Exh^bijfc A_^ (Emphasis added)(Addendum to
appellant's brief page 10)
Finally?

in his Statement of Facts section counsel for

plaintiff/respondent says "William's attorney did not claim
in those objections (referring to the objections to the
judgment submitted to Judge Frederick) that he gave oral
notice to the Court and Rosemary's attorney that he would not
accept the Commissioner's recommendation and he made no such
claim until appeal to the Supreme Court."

(He cites the

record pages 151 to 155 which is Defendant's Objections to
CJudge Frederick's] Proposed Order.) Perhaps he did not read
the following

language on page 152: "The Record

discloses

that a Minute Entry Summary of the proferred evidence and
proposed recommendations of Commissioner Peuler of August 9?
1984? was in the file together with the Entry of the Notation

tb§t it}§ yD^§E§lsD§^ £2yD§§I f?E El§iD^i££ did osi §£2§ei 2E
consent to those recommendations* all on the face of the

document." (Emphasis added)(R. 152)

Indeed counsel

for

plaintiff/ appellant objected on the basis that he had
refused to accept the Commissioner's recommendation ab initio
and that refusal so appears on her minute entry.
to Appellant's Brief, P.

(Addendum

11, 2 2 ) .

Point 1. RESPONDENT'S POINT 1 MISCONSTRUES RULE 8(d) OF THE
DISTRICT COURT'S RULES OF PRACTICE.
In his point one, counsel for respondent imposes a
requirement on Rule 8(d) of the Third District Court Rules
that is simply not there.

In this matter when argued in

front of Judge Frederick, counsel for

plaintiff/respondent

contended that Rule 8(d) required that a Notice of Refusal to
Consent to the Commissioner's Recommendation had to be in
writing served on opposing counsel as has already been
treated in appellent's original brief.

When the Motion for

Summary Disposition was submitted to this Court respondent's
counsel retreated from that position and complained only that
he had not received actual notice of the refusal.

Now in his

brief he is taking the new tack that he got no actual copy of
the minute entry of Commissioner Peuler, therefore somehow
was unaware of

what happened

in open court in front of Judge

Peuler and therefore got no actual notice of plaintiff's
counsel's refusal to consent to the Proposed Order until some
fourteen days later when the Notice of the hearing
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in front

of Judge Frederick was sent to him.

This superimposes on

Rule 8(d) a requirement that written notice of the
Commissioner's recommendation is required to be served on
Counsel.

Such an assertion flies directly in the face of

Commissioner Peuler's own affidavit as to what the usage in
her courtroom was both prior to and following the adoption of
Rule 8(d) as detailed

m

our original brief.

It also

thoroughly impeaches respondent's counsel's assertions that
the undersigned now admit no written notice was given and
that we are now making claim for the first time on appeal
oral notification.

Commissioner Peuler received oral

notification in open court? that matter was raised
of Judge Frederick

of

in the objections to judgment

in front

(R.

152)

and has been reiterated both in the Motion for Summary
Disposition and in the original brief on appeal.
Respondent's repeatedly stating that the
"transcript" bears no record of the undersigned's refusal to
accept the Commissioner's recommendation

(when that

"transcript" is obviously incomplete on its face) simply
won't wash in view of Commissioner Peuler's affidavit saying
that the undersigned did in fact so notify the Court in open
court at the time.

Moreover

it is further controverted by

the Commissioner's own minute entry.

Finally? the only

rational explanation as to why the Commissioner
-13-

would

identify Judge Frederick as the judge to hear further
proceedings would have to be grounded on a basis of
nonconsent.

There would need to be no notice to counsel as

to whom the Judge was to be* if in fact her recommendations
had been accepted.

No wonder, of course, that counsel for

respondent wished to have the Peuler affidavit stricken.

No

wonder as well that he tries to explain away the minute entry
with the phrase "It is unknown why this notation is in the
record"i

but then volunteers?

"it did not result from any

statement in open court by William's attorney."
Brief p.

(Respondent's

13) and just baldly asserts no such statement was

made in front of Rosemary or Rosemary's attorney.
fault respondent for his memory as to what did or

We don't
didn't take

place but we do affirmatively assert that it is not for

him

to claim that what is in the record didn't in fact happen.
That goes beyond the simple matter of memory.

With regard to

the transcription of the tape there isn't just the issue of
its being prematurely being "turned off'but also there

are

statements in that transcript that show that the transcriber
was unable to determine what was being said and
repeatedly

therefore

inserted the words (inaudible) or (unaudible) and

we once again reassert that on

its face therefore, a reading

of the transcript shows it to be incomplete.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Rule 8(d) of
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the Rules of Practice provides that a party objecting to the
recommendation of the Commissioner

"shallj within five (5)

days of entry_ of the Commissioner's recommendation?

provide

notice to the commissioner's office and opposing counsel
the recommended order is not acceptable."

that

(Emphasis added)

Rule 58A(c) provides that the judgment is "entered"
when the same "is signed and filed."
Entry was filed? but never

The aforesaid

Minute

signed by Commissioner Peuler and

therefore was never entered.

Therefore? the five-day period

never began to run? certainly not before appellant requested
in writing a hearing before Judge Frederick and served a copy
on respondent.
The Rules of Practice

do not supersede the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure (see Rule 2.1 of Rules of Practice).
By enacting the Rules of Practice?

there was no intention? we

believe? to deprive a litigant of any substantial
granted him by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

right
In

hearings? under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? a number
of safeguards are

built in to prevent just the very kind of

problem that has given rise to this appeal.

Further? under

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? written orders?

judgments

and decrees must be served under Rule 2.9 of the Rules of
Practice and litigants have a clear opportunity to know the
exact text of the order being entered against them and
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are

given knowledge as to when an order will be entered.
was not observed

in this case.

Furthermore?
litigants are

This

in proceedings before the Court?

granted ten days (not five) to file a motion

for a new trial? to modify or amend a judgment or other
related relief.

The procedure before the Commissioner should

not be more restrictive.
Commissioner

To the extent procedure before the

is more restrictive or harsh than that which

prevails before a judge it is invalid as being m

opposition

to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? and furthermore is a
result that was never

intended? and the procedure before the

Commissioner should not be interpreted to even bring about
such a result in the first place.
We respectfully submit that the procedure adopted
for the use of a commissioner

in the district courts was

intended to simplify handling of domestic relations matters.
It was not intended to deprive litigants of any of the rights
afforded them under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? nor to
become a trap to litigants.

The Rules of Practice themselves

provide that strict compliance can

be waived in the

discretion of the court to prevent manifest injustice.

See

Rule 15.5 of Rules of Practice.
We respectfully submit that Commissioner Peuler has
adopted a reasonable procedure for conducting her affairs as
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set out in her Affidavit and that the defendant fully
complied therewith.

The plaintiff on the other hand is

asking for an erroneous? but in any case very strict
interpretation of said Rule 8 ( d ) * and if it is to be
"strictly" interpreted?

then defendant is entitled to have

the word "entry" "strictly" defined as noted above, and
accordingly the Commissioner's Recommendations have

never

been "entered" within the meaning of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure? and the five day period never did begin to run.

Point 2. RESPONDENT'S POINT II MISSTATES THE IMPACT OF
DISCOVERY FOLLOWING THE COMMISSIONER'S HEARING AS IT RELATES
TO ACTUAL NOTICE.

Respondent's attorney says in point two of his
brief?

"William's attorney does not claim that the Answers to

Interrogatories contained any notice that he would not accept
the recommendations of the Commissioner."
Brief page 1^)

(Respondent's

Perhaps counsel meant to say that the

Interrogatories themselves have nothing

in their express

verbiage saying this is notice of nonconcurrence.
the sentence is meaningless.
that discovery

In any event?

Otherwise

it is clear

itself would be fruitless if defendant/

appellant had consented to the Commissioner's
recommendations?

and the act of pursuing discovery

constituted notice.
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itself

Nevertheless? respondent goes on to argue that the
Interrogatories

n

are

not part of

the record and they should

not be considered by this Court" (Respondent's Brief pages
and 1 5 ) .
are

lb

He cites no authority to claim discovery responses

not part of the court records nor does he quarrel with

the fact that the appropriate certificates were filed with
the District Court showing the Interrogatories had been
served and the Answers had in turn been served
Appellant's Brief pages El and 2 5 ) .

(Addendum to

Respondent cites no law

in making that remarkable statement and one wonders for what
purposes the Answers to Interrogatories do form a part of the
record since he cites those very Answers to Interrogatories
in his Brief at pages b and 5.
for his purposes but not for

Are they a part of the record

the appellant's?

The assertion made by respondent's counsel that
Answers to Interrogatories herein are

"not part of the

record" arises we suppose from the recent change in the Rules
of Procedure that provide that counsel serve Requests for
Admissions and Interrogatories and Answers thereto on parties
and file only with the Clerk of the Court a certificate
indicating such were served somehow now means technically
they are not part of the "record."

The absurdity of that

argument? however, is manifest in the situation where if a
Request for Admission is admitted or denied in documents
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served on counsel the receiving party cannot rely

thereon

because somehow the original response has not been filed with
the clerk and hence is not a part of the "record" and is
therefore not an admitted fact or for that matter a denied
fact.

Indeed the Request for Admission is a meaningless

gesture.

By the same token Responses to

Interrogatories

would be equally meaningless and there would? of course? be
no need for them to be executed? acknowledged or sworn to by
appropriate corporate officers if addressed to such an entity
or otherwise because none of the material found therein is
chargeable against the party so responding since they ar&
technically part of the "record".

not

It would make such answers

equivalent to depositions and require some further procedural
requirement that they have to be filed and "published"
depositions before becoming part of the record.
is nothing

like

Since there

in the rules providing for publishing of Answers

to Interrogatories or Responses to Requests for Admissions?
counsel's statement has effectively wiped out the usefulness
of Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions as a discovery
device.

The undersigned maintains this Court will reject

such a narrow

interpretation.

Counsel for respondent then makes the curious
argument that since the Courts in domestic relations matters
retain continuing

jurisdiction?

the mere filing of
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Interrogatories is no indication that a recommendation of a
Commissioner

is not accepted.

It apparently makes no

difference to him therefore that the clear import of all of
the questions making up the body of those

Interrogatories

relates exclusively and solely to the facts involved with the
matter on which the Commissioner has ruled.

Curious it is

that discovery pertaining to the Commissioner's ruling and
the facts presented to her somehow must be construed as
ongoing investigation for some future Order to Show Cause.
Such an interpretation stretches credulity.

Point 3. RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE IS UNWARRANTED

Respondent's brief quarrels with the "unsigned
affidavit" of Commissioner Peuler as referred
this brief.

to earlier

m

As noted above? the original signed affidavit

is already a part of the record

in this court and a copy is

attached hereto, and does in fact reflect the appropriate
usage and interpretation of Rule 8(d) of the Third District
Court Rules of

Practice and is therefore highly germane and

ligitimately a matter for consideration by this Court.
Moreover, the Real Estate Documents attached

in the

addendum of our principal brief were there for this Court's
convenience and were corroborated by a recorded Notice of
Contract.

Respondent did not want the trial court to see the
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contract of sale (Addendum pages 13-16) and does not want
this Court to see the same, because it points out rather
clearly that the buyer of respondent/defendant's Holladay
home did in fact assume the mortgages payments and executed a
hold harmless agreement with

plaintiff/respondent

indemnifying her in the payment of both mortgages.
Admittedly that contract is not a part of the record below
solely and only because Judge Frederick refused to permit
appellant to go forward with evidence.

It is placed as an

addendum to the brief here to show this Court that a
legitimate issue of fact going to the heart of this
controversy could have and should have been allowed to be
raised

in the Court below.

Of course that document

completely discredits respondent's repeated assertions that
his client alone is liable on that mortgage? so his
reluctance to have it before this Court is understandable.
The aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contract is
particularly pivotal

in view of what Commissioner

Peuler

herself says regarding whether or not plaintiff/respondent
had been relieved from paying the mortgage obligation:
"THE COURT: I think that perhaps if she had sold
the home outright and relieved herself of that mortgage
9bij.gatj.cm5 I might be persuaded that the outcome may be
different; but it is my belief that as long as she is
obligated on these mortgage payments then he should
continue to comply with the requirements of the divorce
decree . . . " (Emphasis added)(R. 238 and E 3 9 ) .

-El-

Point 4. JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER DOES NOT CONFORM TO
COMMISSIONER PEULER'S RECOMMENDATIONS.
Respondent

indicates? and

after the hearing in front of

the record

indeed discloses,

Judge Frederick he ex parte

filed an affidavit claiming $1,400 in attorney's fees and
submitted an Order as to form to Commissioner Peuler, leaving
the attorney's fees amount blank and asking the commissioner
to fill m

what she chose to award by way of an attorney's

fee as indicated

in his letter of October 15, filed with the

Clerk of the court October 19, 1984, (R.146).

What his

argument neglects to say is that there is nothing

in the

transcript of the proceedings before Commissioner Peuler that
shows attorney's fees were even alluded to by way of prefer,
demand, or otherwise and they were not.

Moreover there being

no hearing in front of Judge Frederick on the issue of
attorney's fees counsel

is now proposing to suggest that this

Court should affirm a decree based upon the Commissioner
filling in the amount following the hearing

in front of Judge

Frederick based solely upon his self-serving affidavit filed
after the hearing

m

front of Judge Frederick

he asked for $1,400 and only got $150.

largely because

He is asking

this

Court to ratify his doing indirectly what he failed to do and
probably wouldn't have succeeded

m

doing directly.

Far more serious, however, in p oint 4, counsel for
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respondent asserts that the Order is in conformity with the
Commissioner's recommendations with regard to a purported
mortgage on the Evanston property and cites a part of the
Commissioner's holding in that regard which or\ its face
indicated that the Commissioner, while leaning

in the

direction requested by Counsel for respondent, indicated she
didn't have sufficient facts before her to modify the decreeCommissioner Peuler stated as follows: "And if the plaintiff
feels there is sufficient equity there to protect, I think at
that point, she is probably going to have to come in and ask
that the decree be modified."

(R. E39)

That statement by

itself implies that the Commissioner anticipated
hearing either before herself or Judge Frederick.

further
But the

matter was broached again later by counsel for respondent as
fo1 lows:
"MR. NELSON: My only question, Your Honor, would
be as to the mortgage.
It's by his own refusal to obey
the Courts degree Csicl that she's in the position she
is m now.
It seems to me that we shouldn't be having
to ask the Court to modify the decree when he's the one
who made it impossible to live by.
THE COURT: Well, I guess the real problem that I
have with that right now is that I don't know what the
liability was on that rental property at the time the
parties entered into this agreement? and I certainly
don't know what the liability is now, so I don't know
what changes it would be.
MR. NELSON: You're absolutely right.
for that. You're absolutely right.
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I apologize

THE COURT: And I think — well, what I was going
to say, is that I think it's going to take some further
action before the Court can make a determination.
MR. NELSON:

I think you're right."

(R. 240)

With regard to that substitute mortgage on the
Evanston property the undersigned argued to the Commissioner
that if indeed that substitute mortgage was to cover
respondent's equity in her home and guarantee that the
plaintiff/appellant pay the first mortgage on her home that
with the sale of

the home and the assuming of the mortgage

thereon by her buyer there would no longer need to be
security to guarantee payment of the mortgage since a third
person had assumed it.

(R. 236)

The Commissioner, of

course, did not accept that argument, did not choose to view
the facts as appellant/defendant argued them, partly because
she did not have the Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to
above before her.
At any event, for counsel to argue as he does at
Point 4 that the Commissioner was prepared to recommend

that

a mortgage on the Evanston property justifying his putting
such an express paragraph

in the Order that he had Judge

Frederick sign (paragraph 2, R. 148, 149) is simply not
supported by the record of the proceedings in front of
Commi ssioner Peuler.
Respondent finally argued that the Commissioner's
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ambivalence as we have just noted above was whether

the

property to be mortgaged was Evanston property or Midvale
property but he cites nothing in the record to demonstrate
that and indeed there is no discussion along those lines to
be found.

It is further significant, that in his letter of

transmittal to Commissioner Peuler

(R. 14-6) counsel for

respondent does not point out that he has put in a new
paragraph requiring the execution of a mortgage on Evanston
property.

He refers rather, only to his Affidavit for

Attorney's Fees and a blank in the paragraph for her to fill
in the dollar amount.

In short he turns the language of the

Commissioner's recommendation:

"Defendant is obligated

what the divorce decree required him to do."

to do

(R. 137) into

"Defendant is hereby ordered to deliver to plaintiff a
mortgage or trust deed on the real property awarded to
defendant at 1201 Sage? Evanston, Wyoming, and the amount of
the first mortgage on plaintiff's house, 4-612 Belmour Way,
Salt Lake City, Utah, as required by the original decree
divorce."

of

And he does that in spite of the foregoing

language of the Commissioner
to do for lack of

indicating her unwillingness so

sufficient facts.

Point 5. THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT CORRECT ON THE MERITS.
Without reviewing again respondent's
account of the "true facts" which are
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inaccurate

not true at all

(which

plaintiff purportedly summarizes in Point 5 ) ? the truth is
this matter nev&r

has been heard on the merits.

We believe

that the established facts show that the payments to which
plaintiff was given a judgment by the lower court were in
their nature alimony not property settlement.

Nevertheless

if any doubt exists on the true nature of the payment?
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that
quest ion.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons together with those advanced
in the original Brief of appellant the judgment of the
District Court should be reversed, and the case should be
remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits before
the District Court.

Respectfully submi tted,

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Respondent/
Appellant

-26-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant J. William
Wiscombe to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for

Plaintiff-

Respondent, 1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84101 this

day of January, 19S5.

GORDON A. MADSEN
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GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorneys for Defendant
320 South Third East
Salt LaketCity, Utah 84111
Telephone 322-1141
5F
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMISSIONER
SANDRA PEULER

vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE

Case No. 20333

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss
)

Sandra Peuler, having been duly sworn upon her oath,
deposes and says:
!•.

That she is over the age of 21 years, competent and

makes this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

That she is the Domestic Relations Commissioner for

the Third Judicial District Court and was acting as such on the
9th day of August, 1984.
3. * That the usage in her courtroom, both before and
since the adoption of Rules of Procedure for the Third District
Court, and particularly as it relates to Rule 8(d), was and is
that if a party in a domestic relations matter did not agree or

Addendum Page 1

concur with the said Commissioner's recommended order, the party
could so inform the Court at the time; or should such party wish
additional time for deliberation before deciding, could do so at
any time within five (5) days from the date of the hearing.

Such

notice or communication of disagreement or nonconcurrence has
never been required by Commissioner Peuler to be submitted in
writing.

Frequently the nonconcurrence was announced in open

court at the time the recommended order was announced, in which
case such nonconcurrence would be noted in the minute entry for
that date.

Such a disagreement or nonconcurrence on the part of

the defendant in the case of Wiscombe v. Wiscombe was made by
counsel in open court and so noted on Commissioner Peuler1s minute
entry in that matter dated August 9, 1984, copy of which is
annexed hereto as Exhibit A.

SANDRA PEULER, COMMISSIONER
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/^/

—

day of

December, 1984.

N
i

» *

»

\

>

s*^u*lL

My Commission Expires:

Addendum Page 2
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RULES OF PRACTICE
RULE 2.1.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

These rules shall govern the practice and procedure in
the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah
in all matters not specifically covered by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Addendum Page 3

RULES OF PRACTICE

RULE 2.9.

WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND DECREES

(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days,
or

within shorter time as the court may direct, file with

the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity
wi th the ruling.
(b)

Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments,

and/or

Orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders.
submitted to

Notice of

objections thereto shall be

the court and counsel within five (5) days after

service.
(c)

Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be

reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature
within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal.
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RULES OF PRACTICE

Rule 15,5
(a)

EXCEPTION
All Court rules of practice and administrative

orders effecting procedure and practice in force and existing
prior to the effective date of these rules are vacated.
(b)

Courts deeming it necessary to re-enact prior

court rules or develop rules supplemental to these rules
shall do so by administrative order in accordance with Rule
11.1 and Rule 11.2.
(c>

Strict compliance with the foregoing rules may be

waived by the court, in its discretion, in order to prevent
manifest injustice.
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